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Abstract—Over the years, the wide-spread usage of smart-
phones leads to large amounts of personal data being stored by
them. These data, in turn, can be accessed by the apps installed
on the smartphones, and potentially misused, jeopardizing the
privacy of smartphone users. While the app stores provide
indicators that allow an estimation of the privacy risks of
individual apps, these indicators have repeatedly been shown as
too confusing for the lay users without technical expertise. We
have developed an information flyer with the goal of providing
decision support for these users and enabling them make more
informed decisions regarding their privacy upon choosing and
installing smartphone apps. Our flyer is based on previous
research in mental models of smartphone privacy and security
and includes heuristics for choosing privacy-friendlier apps used
by IT-security experts. It also addresses common misconceptions
of users regarding smartphones. The flyer was evaluated in a user
study. The results of the study show, that the users who read the
flyer tend to take privacy-relevant factors into account by relying
on the heuristics in the flyer more often. Hence, the flyer succeeds
in supporting users in making more informed privacy-related
decisions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile devices, in particular, smartphones have gained
particular prominence in people’s lives and are used on a daily
basis for a variety of tasks. As a result, these devices accumulate
large amounts of personal data, such as contacts, pictures, or
information about the user’s location. Correspondingly, these
data can be accessed by smartphone apps that are installed by
the users. Misuse of such data by a malicious app provider
can pose a serious threat to the users’ privacy, defined as
the possibility of controlling the circumstances and conditions
under which personal information is collected and processed
by third parties [7], [24].
Yet, research has shown that users often fail to consider
necessary precaution measures to protect their privacy (e.g., [3],
[28]). A possible reason for the neglection of privacy friendly
behavior is that users often do not take privacy into account
when making decisions in their day-to-day smartphone usage.
This is partially due to users being unaware of privacy risks
or underestimating them, but also because privacy is not the
primary task of the users, as opposed to main functionality of
the apps, such as sending messages or checking the weather
report [9].
On the other hand, even if the users are willing to protect
their privacy, they often lack the knowledge on how to
do so. While there are indicators like permission warnings,
previous research has shown that these are often deemed to
be confusing for the users [12]. Furthermore, a number of
prevalent misconceptions, such as the belief that all apps in the
official stores (Apple Store or Play Store) do not pose any risk
[18] often prevent users from taking proper protection measures.
The research in usable security and privacy therefore recognizes
the need to consider the existing mental models and knowledge
of the end users for developing measures for supporting and
encouraging security and privacy friendly behaviour [26].
In an attempt to support users in decision making regarding
smartphone apps, a study by Kulyk et al. [14] interviewed IT-
security experts about how they choose and install smartphone
apps. As the experts were expected to possess the necessary
knowledge and awareness regarding privacy and to attempt
to optimize their day-to-day practices, the authors used the
results from their interviews to derive a set of heuristics. These
heuristics were designed to support users in making informed
privacy-related decisions regarding the management of apps on
their smartphone. The effectiveness of the derived heuristics
has not been evaluated yet.
In this work, we aim to develop a concept for informa-
tion materials, designed to support informed privacy-related
decisions for smartphone end users. Therefore, we rely on the
heuristics developed by Kulyk et al. [14] that are presented
to the user. In addition to the heuristics, we furthermore aim
to raise awareness among the users and motivate them for
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considering their privacy as a decision criterion in choosing
smartphone apps. For this, we address common misconceptions
among smartphone users regarding their privacy which we
derived from a literature review. The developed concept has
furthermore been implemented as an information flyer and
evaluated in a user study with 38 participants. The results of
our study show, that the flyer succeeds in supporting informed
decisions of smartphone users by leading them to consider
privacy to a larger extent in their decisions.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. We
describe our literature review, explain the resulting miscon-
ceptions of smartphone users and summarize the heuristics
from [14] in Section II. We describe the contents of the flyer
incorporating the heuristics and addressed misconceptions in
Section III. Section IV describes our user study conducted to
evaluate the developed flyer, and the results of the evaluation
are provided in Section V. We discuss the results in Section VI,
followed an overview of related work in Section VII, and
conclude the paper in Section VIII.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section we describe the background which we relied
upon in the development of the content for our concept.
A. Smartphone Privacy Misconceptions
As our goal was to address the common misconceptions
that prevent the users from protecting their smartphone privacy,
we conducted a literature research1 in order to find out what
these misconceptions are. In this, we searched the scientific
literature databases SpringerLink, ACM, IEEE, Scopus and
Science Direct using the following search terms: ”smartphone
misconception”, ”smartphone misunderstanding”, ”smartphone
misperception”, ”smartphone flawed perception”, ”smartphone
flawed understanding”2. We limited our search to peer-reviewed
articles in English language, the full text of which were available
via our institution. Among the results, we looked for the
publications that conducted qualitative studies on the security
and privacy related misconceptions for smartphones. We omitted
the publications that either provided the misconceptions very
specific to a particular OS version (such as a misunderstand-
ing of the explanation text of an Android permission). We
furthermore omitted misconceptions that, while relying on an
incorrect mental model of the users, do not lead to insecure
behaviour. For the remaining publications we conducted a
forward reference search using the same search terms.
The literature review resulted in nine publications [1], [2],
[5], [12], [17], [18], [21], [25], [27]. The misconceptions found
in these publications can be summarized as follows:
• ”I have nothing to hide”: the users’ belief that they
would not be harmed by potential privacy violations.
• ”I am too unimportant”: belief that only prominent
people such as politicians or CEOs can become targets
of attacks on their privacy
1The research was conducted in August 2017.
2Note, the search terms included only ”smartphone” and not the ”smart
phone” word form.
• ”If my smartphone is secured, my privacy is ensured
as well”: belief that the privacy can be violated only
via attacks and malware apps.
• ”Only the data that is input explicitly can be leaked”:
belief that the data can be collected only if the users
input it in an app themselves.
• ”If the company is trustworthy, then it is safe to provide
my data to them”: belief that trustworthy companies
always manage to keep their customer’s data secure.
• ”There is nothing I can do against it”: belief that the
users are powerless to protect their privacy against
attackers and companies that collect their data.
B. Privacy-Friendly App Choice Heuristics
In order to support the users who want to take measures and
protect the privacy on their smartphones, we chose to provide
a list of heuristics that the users can apply when installing and
using smartphone apps. Therefore, we relied on the previous
work by Kulyk et al. [14] that interviewed IT-security experts
with the goal of eliciting heuristics that these experts use. These
heuristics are classified into the following four categories:
1) Permission-related: These heuristics relate to the
permissions requested by the app, such as considering
whether the permissions are reasonable given the app’s
functionality.
2) Developer-related:These heuristics relate to the de-
velopers of the app, such as reviewing the website of
the developers to evaluate their trustworthiness.
3) Socially-related:These heuristics relate to the feed-
back of other users for the app, such as searching the
app’s reviews for mentioned privacy issues.
4) Avoidance techniques:These heuristics aim to mini-
mize the exposure of data to apps, such as avoiding
the storage of data that is particularly sensitive on a
smartphone.
III. FLYER
In this section we describe our developed concept in a
form of an information flyer3. The flyer has been developed
via multiple iterative feedback sessions in order to incorporate
feedback from potential users early during the design process.
The flyer is structured into the two parts misconceptions and
heuristics. We describe both of the parts in more details below.
A. Part I: Misconceptions
The first part is structured as an FAQ and addresses the
common misconceptions that prevent the users from protecting
their smartphone privacy. The purpose of this part is to make
the users aware of the possibility of privacy violations on
their smartphone and to motivate them to take protection
measures against such violations. To develop this part we relied
upon misconceptions found via a literature review described in
Section II-A. For each misconception, we provided a response
as follows4:
3The flyer is available under https://secuso.org/smartphone-privacy-flyer,
including the version used our study.
4Translated from German.
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1) ”I have nothing to hide”: Even if you do nothing
illegal, collecting your data has disadvantages. For instance,
the data could be used by hackers to learn more about you.
This knowledge could be used for a targeted attack (so-called
Spear Phishing) against you by sending e-mails with personal
information. Furthermore, the more someone know about you,
the easier it gets to influence your buying behavior or election
decisions. Additionally, keep in mind the exact knowledge
about your current whereabouts in criminal hands (such as
burglars) can pose a serious threat.
2) ”I am too unimportant”: It is very easy to collect data
in a large scale, especially as many things are shared publicly.
Even if you consider it unlikely that you could be ”interesting”,
your data (e.g. who you call at what time) are collected.
3) ”If my smartphone is secured, my privacy is ensured as
well”: Privacy and security of a device do not necessarily have
something to do with each other. Especially because a lot of
your data is quite often collected by companies from apps and
advertising networks and resold.
4) ”Apps from app stores are secure by default”: While
avoiding apps from inofficial stores is a good protection strategy,
the official stores are not immune to malicious software. The
stores contain millions of apps and these are not all individually
tested by hand. Furthermore, apps that are not technically
malware can still collect and share your private information.
5) ”Only the data that is input explicitly can be leaked”:
Because of the way smartphones work, apps have often not
only access to direct input, but also on personal data stored on
the smartphone (e.g., images). This can be done without your
knowledge in the background.
6) ”If the company is trustworthy, then it is safe to provide
my data to them”: Even trustworthy companies can become the
victims of hacker attacks. You should be careful and consider
what data is really needed for the features, even if you trust
the company.
7) ”There is nothing I can do against it”: Although some
services and apps need access to private data for their basic
functions, there are many privacy-friendly alternatives. What
you can do against it is written on the following pages of this
flyer.
B. Part II: Heuristics
The second part of the flyer is based on the heuristics
by Kulyk et al. that we describe in Section II-B. The users
can apply these heuristics during the installation or usage of
smartphone apps in order to minimize the risks of privacy
violations by these apps. Whenever possible we provided
information where to find the relevant information (e.g.,
information regarding permissions required by an app) in the
Play Store.
We transformed the four heuristic categories, which in total
contain thirteen heuristics, into ten guidelines for our flyer.
Note, the heuristics by Kulyk et al. were derived from the
practices of IT-security experts, therefore some of them include
recommendations that rely on some sort of additional technical
expertise. Since our flyer is designed for lay users, we modified
the heuristics accordingly. We describe the resulting guidelines
in more detail below.
1) Permissions: The user is advised to check the reasonabil-
ity of permissions. If a permission does not match the app’s
functionality, the user is advised either not to install the app or
not grant to permission. Furthermore, it is described where the
user can gather information of an app’s required permissions
in the Play Store. The permission-related heuristics by Kulyk
et al. furthermore allows accepting a permission in case the
data sharing can be minimized with other means, for example,
by using additional software. We did not transform this info a
guideline since this requires expert knowledge, but our flyer
targets ordinary users.
2) App functionality: In this part of the flyer, the user is
advised to check the functionality of an app. The app should
not contain functionality that is superfluous for the user. The
more superfluous functionality an app has, the more likely it
is that the app requires non-reasonable permissions.
3) Number of downloads: The user is advised to check the
number of downloads of an app and to prefer those with a big
user basis. Furthermore, this heuristic contains a description
where to find the number of downloads in the Play Store.
4) Reviews of other users: The reviews of other users
should be read carefully. Especially negative reviews or those
mentioning privacy issues of an app should be taken into
account when making the decision whether to install an app.
A description where to find the number of downloads in the
Play Store is also given to the user.
5) On-going development: On-going development meaning
the last update of an app is an indicator for potential privacy
issues. If an update lies long in the past, the developer might
not have patched security loopholes. A description where to
find the last update is given to the user.
6) Developer: The user is advised to check the app’s
developer. To gain information about the developer, the user can
visit the developer’s website. The following aspects indicate
the trustworthiness of a developer:
• The developer offers many apps to a large user base.
• The developer is from a country with legal regulations
regarding data privacy.
• The developer is a large company with a good reputa-
tion.
• The developer provides a privacy policy.
The developer-related heuristics by Kulyk et al. contain
”contact to the developer” meaning that the user can seek direct
contact to the developer before making their decision about
app installation. Due to the potential complexity of the process
involved, we did not include this heuristic into our flyer.
7) Other apps of the developer: The user is advised to look
for other apps by the same developer in the Play Store. The
previously mentioned heuristics should also be considered for
those other apps.
8) Media reports about the app or its developer: News
and media reports about the app and its developer can help
the users in making the decision whether to install the app.
Users are guided to look for privacy as well as security-related
reports.
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Fig. 1. Graphical overview of the study design.
9) Deinstallation of unused apps: Besides the guidelines
about information that user should consider before installing
an app, the flyer contains the advise to regularly check apps
that are installed on the device. If apps are not required any
longer, the user is advised to uninstall them, because uninstalled
apps can no longer lead to data leakage. Furthermore, the flyer
contains information on how to deinstall an Android app.
10)Transfer of sensitive data to other devices: Finally, the
user is advised to transfer privacy sensitive data (e.g., pictures)
to another device. By doing so, privileged apps have access to
less privacy-sensitive data.
The avoidance techniques by Kulyk et al. contain ”avoid
negative vibes” meaning that experts use their expert knowledge
to make a judgment. We did not include this heuristic into our
flyer, because the flyer does not target expert users.
IV. USER STUDY
The study design is briefly presented in Figure 1 and
described in more detail below. Afterwards, the store app that
we used for our study is presented in detail as well as the tasks
we asked from the participants. Subsequently, the sample is
described in more detail and finally the hypotheses to be tested
are presented.
A. Study Design
All participants were randomly drawn to either the trial
group or the control group. Each participant was sent a flyer
by e-mail seven days before the test date. In the case of the
experimental group, this was our flyer with heuristics on app
selection (see Section III), in the case of the control group a
flyer on phishing attacks and how to protect yourself against
them. The mentioned goal of the study was to evaluate a new
app. The experiment itself took place in a laboratory of the
Institute of Psychology at the university and lasted between 20
and 30 minutes.
In the laboratory, all participants received a short oral
instruction on the test procedure. This entailed that they were
to select a total of five different apps from four different
alternatives. Throughout the study the participants did not use
their own smartphones, but were provided with a lab device.
In each case, they should use the store app that we have
programmed (see Section IV-B), which is to be evaluated. No
more detailed evaluation targets were mentioned. Furthermore,
the participants were informed that the contents of the screen
will be recorded during the experiment so that a later evaluation
of the user interaction can be carried out. Afterwards, each
participant was given a written instruction with the type of app
to be searched for and the functional requirements. The order
of the five different app categories was randomly determined
for each participant. As soon as the participant was satisfied
with his or her decision, he or she informed the investigator
and was handed over the next of the five tasks.
After all five tasks were completed, the screen recording was
finished. Participants were then asked about each decision. First
of all, the criteria considered were asked for each individual
app decision. Subsequently, the individual criteria were named
on the basis of the heuristics (see Section III-B) and asked
whether they were taken into account for the decisions. These
included the following: (1) the developer, (2) requested app
permissions, (3) if functionality equals the instructions, (4)
number of downloads, (5) user reviews, (6) the app rating, (7)
the date of the last update.
Finally, each participant was asked if and when he or she
read the flyer. In addition, he or she was asked to briefly
summarize the contents of the flyer. Afterwards, the gender,
age, the Android version used on the own device, and the
student’s course of study or profession were recorded.
B. Study App
The participants used a lab device with a mock Play Store
app for choosing and installing apps within our study. The
mock Play Store was specifically designed and implemented
for the purpose of the study. Our mock Play Store app mimics
the design of Google Play Store, such that the participants had
the same user experience choosing and installing apps as they
have on their private devices. To make sure that participants
do not choose apps that they previously knew, all apps and
their icons in the mock Play Store are fictional. The similarities
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Fig. 2. Screenshots of the original Play Store and or study app. (a) app search in the Play Store, (b) app search in our study app, (c) app details page in the
Play Store and (d) app details page in our study app.
and differences in the design of our mock up and the original
Play Store are depicted by Figure 2a)-d).
C. Tasks
In each task, the participants were given a description of
the functionality the app had to provide, and the mock Play
Store provided four apps with a different level of privacy-
friendliness according to a certain criterion outlined in the flyer.
We investigated only one criterion from the flyer per task and
made sure that only this criterion is salient. Therefore, other
information that is not criterion-related was kept similar. The
criterion-related information was chosen in a way such that
there is an objectively best app choice for each task from a
privacy perspective. The tasks were designed to evaluate to
which extent the participants were willing or able to use the
heuristics provided within the flyer in the following way. The
objective best choice is always given first.
The objectively best choice is that which, based on the
heuristics presented in the flyer, is the most privacy-friendly al-
ternative and at the same time meets all functional requirements.
If not all functional requirements are met, the alternative in
question is not objectively the best, regardless of how privacy-
friendly it is.
1) Task 1 – Permissions: Four Sudoku apps were available
here. The apps differed with regards to the permissions they
requested upon installation (heuristic ”permissions”):
• requested only non-dangerous5 permissions,
• requested one dangerous permission not necessary for
the functionality
• requested two dangerous permissions that were not
necessary for the functionality,
5We relied on the classification of the permissions into dangerous and non-
dangerous in Android as provided at https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/
permissions/overview.html\#normal-dangerous accessed on March 10th 2018.
• requested three dangerous permissions that were not
necessary for the functionality.
2) Task 2 – Offered versus required functionality: Four
shopping apps were available here. The apps differed with
regards to the functionally they offered and, correspondingly,
the permissions they requested upon installation. All requested
permissions were required for the offered functionality, but only
one of the alternatives offered exactly the required functionality
and therefore requested only necessary permissions (heuristic
”app functionality”):
• the offered functionality equals the required function-
ality from the instruction,
• the offered functionality is less than required, so
fewer permissions are requested compared to the first
shopping app but the app does not fulfill all the
instructed needs,
• some additional functionality is offered and therefore
more permissions are requested compared to first
shopping app,
• even more additional functionality is offered and there-
fore even more permissions are requested compared
to the first shopping app.
3) Task 3 – Social metrics: Four audio-recording apps were
available here. The apps differed with regards to the number
of ratings, the user reviews and the number of downloads
(heuristic ”number of downloads”):
• around 450 ratings, 10,000 downloads and only positive
reviews,
• around 700 ratings, 14,000 downloads but privacy-
related negative reviews present,
• around 450 ratings, 10,000 downloads but privacy-
related negative reviews present,
• around 50 ratings, 600 downloads and only one review
5
4) Task 4 – Up-to-dateness: Four QR-scanner apps were
available here. The apps differed with regards to the date of
their last update (heuristic ”on-going development”):
• a few days ago,
• several months ago,
• more than a year ago.
• more than a year ago.
5) Task 5 – Developer: Four mailing apps were available
here. The apps differed with regards to the trustworthiness of
their developer (heuristic ”developer”):
• a research institution with a user friendly privacy policy
that has developed several apps,
• a single researcher with a user friendly privacy policy
that has developed only one app,
• a large firm from a country with weak privacy pro-
tection laws providing a privacy policy with explicitly
stated collection and usage of user data,
• a developer without a website or a privacy policy or
other apps.
For Task 1, mock websites for the developers were provided,
which the participants could access from the mock Play Store
app on the lab smartphone.
D. Participants
Participants were recruited via university mailing lists
and student groups on social networks. Each participant was
rewarded with 10 Euros for participation. As an alternative,
students majoring in psychology at our university had the
opportunity to have the trial period credited as test person
hours for their studies.
A total of 38 people took part in the study, who were
divided equally between the two groups of experiments. A total
of twenty male and eighteen female participants participated
in the study. The participants were on average 25.03 years old
(SD = 5.97). Based on self-disclosure during the experiment,
the participants had read the flyer sent to them on average
4.91 days (SD = 2.40) before the test date. All participants
were Android users. Privately seven participants used Android
versions older than 6.0. Correspondingly, 31 participants used
Android 6.0 or newer.
E. Hypotheses
We aimed to evaluate the following hypotheses in our study:
H1 Participants who have received the flyer with app
selection heuristics show a significantly better
decision quality, i.e. they are more likely to choose
the objectively best option.
H2 Participants who have received the flyer with app
selection heuristics use significantly more different
decision factors for their decisions, i.e. made a
more informed decision.
TABLE I. DESCRIPTIVE OVERVIEW OF THE DECISION BEHAVIOUR OF
BOTH TEST GROUPS IN ALL FIVE DECISION SITUATIONS. THE OBJECTIVELY
BEST DECISIONS ARE MARKED BOLD.
Control Treatment
Sudoku
Sudoku Fun 3 4
Sudoku 0 1
Super Sudoku 5 1
Orange Sudoku 11 13
Shopping
Shoppinglist 12 6
BestList 2 8
TopShop 4 1
CrazyShopping 1 4
Audio-
Recording
RecordPlus 14 15
King Record 3 1
Super Recorder 0 1
Recording Guru 2 2
QR-
Scanner
Scanning Total 4 13
FastQR Scan 10 5
EasyQR Scan 5 1
QR Scanning Lite 0 0
Mailing
Unicorn Mail 6 3
Simple Mail 5 7
Direct Mail 6 6
Mailing App 2 3
V. RESULTS
This section describes the results of the study in detail.
First, the evaluation with regard to the decisions made and the
quality thereof (H1), then the decision factors used for this
purpose (H2) and finally the time required as well as other
control variables are displayed.
A. Decision Quality
In order to analyze the decision behaviour of the participants,
the data of the selected app was re-coded so that a 1 stands for
the objectively best choice and a 0 stands for all other choices.
Table I gives a descriptive overview of the decision behaviour
of both experiment groups, with the objectively best choice
being marked.
The inference statistical analysis was carried out by means
of a variance analysis with repeated measurements. The five
decisions made were used as an inner subject-factor and the
experimental condition as a between-subject factor. The analysis
shows a significant main effect of the between-subject factor
(F = 6.23; p < 0.01). Individual comparative tests show
that the participants from the experimental group decided
significantly more frequently (F = 10.57; p < 0.01) for the
objectively best QR-scanner app. There are no significant
differences in the four other decisions (p > 0.05). Since the
first hypothesis is only correct for one of five scenarios, it must
be rejected as a whole.
B. Decision Factors
In order to analyze which information was used by the
participants for making their decisions, the self-reports from
the interview part of the experiment were first coded accordingly
as 1 (correspondingly used) or 0 (not used). Since more could
be mentioned in self-reports than actually used to appear better
in person, these data were corrected afterwards if necessary on
the basis of the screen recordings. For this only 1 to 0 being
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TABLE II. OVERVIEW OF THE ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION TIME, THE DAYS SINCE READING THE FLYER, THE AGE AS WELL AS THE INFORMATION USED
FOR THE DECISION OF BOTH TRIAL GROUPS; THE FIRST TWO COLUMNS PROVIDE DESCRIPTIVE DATA WITH STANDARD DEVIATION OR PERCENTAGES IN
PARENTHESES.
Control Treatment F-value p-value part. η2
Decision time
[seconds]
Sudoku 111.79 (51.21) 145.16 (61.91) 2.883 .098 .074
Shopping 174.00 (86.22) 182.37 (95.70) .080 .779 .002
Audio-Recording 177.58 (63.66) 159.00 (57.92) .885 .353 .024
QR-Scanning 144.37 (50.61) 199.32 (145.76) 2.410 .129 .063
Mailing 165.21 (73.67) 210.26 (102.31) 2.426 .128 .063
Days since flyer read 4.92 (2.52) 4.89 (2.35) .001 .974 .000
Age [years] 25.47 (6.34) 24.58 (5.72) .209 .650 .000
Information
usage
Developer 2 (11%) 13 (68%) 19.446 .000 .351
Permissions Installation Dialog 7 (37%) 19 (100%) 30.857 .000 .462
Permissions Details 4 (21%) 11 (58%) 5.959 .020 .142
Permissions App-Starting Dialog 1 (5%) 11 (58%) 16.981 .000 .321
Functionality = Instruction 17 (89%) 16 (84%) .220 .642 .006
Downloads 15 (79%) 18 (95%) 2.077 .158 .055
Reviews 14 (74%) 19 (100%) 6.429 .016 .152
App Rating 19 (100%) 19 (100%) N/A N/A N/A
Date of Last Update 2 (11%) 10 (53%) 9.290 .004 .205
changed if the corresponding information was not displayed in
the screen recording for at least one second during the decision.
For example, if a participant indicated that he or she has taken
the permission details of the app into account for his or her
decision, but has never looked at the corresponding screen in
the Play Store for at least one of the apps, the 1 based on the
self-report was coded to 0. This was true in only two cases.
No coding from 0 to 1 took place, since the mere display
of corresponding information does not necessarily indicate
that this information was taken into account in a decision.
Forgetting some factors cannot therefore be ruled out. In order
to counteract this, the individual factors were also mentioned
individually, and their consideration queried.
For the hypothesis test, a multivariate analysis of variance
was performed, using the experimental condition as an indepen-
dent variable and the various information types as dependent
variables. Table II shows the results of this analysis in detail
as well as the various information types. Participants in the
trial group were significantly more likely to use information
about the developer, permissions, reviews, and time of the last
update. There were no differences in the usage of the download
numbers, the fit between the offered functionality and the
functional requirements as well as the app rating. The latter was
used by all participants from both groups so that no statistical
evaluation was possible or meaningful. Since the participants
in the experimental group used the individual decision factors
exclusively more frequently or equally frequently for their
decisions, the second hypothesis can be confirmed.
C. Decision Efficiency and Control Variables
Since the second hypothesis postulates that after reading
the flyer more different factors are taken into account for
the decision, it seems plausible that the time required for
the decision increases, i.e. it becomes less efficient. From a
usability perspective, this could have a negative effect on the
acceptance of the flyer. In order to analyze the time required
by the participants for the respective decisions, these were first
determined on the basis of the screen recordings. In each case,
the time of the first interaction (e.g., selecting the search field
or scrolling in the list) was the starting point. The end point
was either the click on the installation button or if the app
was subsequently opened by the participant, the confirmation
or rejection of the last requested permission, whereupon the
respective app displayed a message that the investigator had to
be notified.
The inference statistical analysis was carried out by means
of a variance analysis with repeated measurements, whereby
the time required for the individual decisions was used as
an inner-subject factor and the experimental condition as a
between-subject factor. This shows a significant main effect
of the between-subject factor (F = 6.37; p < 0.01). However,
individual comparative tests show no significant differences
between the two groups for the individual decisions (p > 0.05).
The detailed results of the individual comparisons can also be
found in Table II, which also provides a descriptive data.
Similarly, there were no significant differences between the
two groups in age (F = 0.209; p = 0.65) or in the number of
days since the flyer was read (F = 0.001; p = 0.974).
VI. DISCUSSION
The results of our study show, that for the most apps the
participants in the treatment group did not choose a privacy-
friendlier option. The only exception was the choice of a QR-
code app whereby the options differed in their up-to-dateness,
and the best option was an app that was updated a few days
before the study (as opposed to updates that were several months
or years old, or non-existent at all). It therefore is worthy of
further investigation, whether the importance of up-to-dateness
as a decision factor is generally perceived more important to
the end users, and for what reasons.
Still, the two other tasks that did not show any significant
differences in decision quality between control and treatment
groups, the number of participants who chose a privacy-
friendlier option was rather high in both groups. As such,
11 out of 19 participants in the control group (58%) and 13 out
of 19 participants in the treatment group (68%) preferred the
app with the fewest permissions. Similarly, in the task where
the apps differed in their social metrics, the vast majority in
both control (74%) and treatment (79%) group chose an app
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that had the highest number of downloads and reviews, and
did not contain any negative reviews regarding privacy. It can
therefore be concluded, that the participants were mostly aware
of these factors before the study. On the contrary, a relatively
low number of participants (26% in the control group, 37% in
the treatment group) chose a privacy-friendlier option in the
task where the apps differed regarding their developer. One
possible reason could be the additional effort required to check
the trustworthiness of the developer, i.e. to visit the developer’s
website and read the information about the developer as well
as privacy policies. It therefore remains open to investigate, to
which extent the participants’ decisions can be improved, if
an understandable presentation of the trustworthiness of the
developer is provided to the end user.
In the final task, the participants in the control group
were more likely to choose an app that requested the fewest
permissions while providing all the functionality as outlined in
the task description (63% in the control group versus 32%
in the treatment group). The participants in the treatment
group, on the other hand, preferred the app that requested
the fewest permissions out of all options, yet lacked some of
the functionality (11% in the control group versus 42% in the
treatment group). Hence, many participants in the treatment
group chose a privacy-friendlier option, even if they neglected
the task description.
Overall, while the flyer did not lead the participants
to choosing the objectively best alternatives, it increased
their ability to make informed decisions regarding their app
choices. Our results show that significantly more participants
in the treatment group considered factors that are crucial in
determining an app’s privacy-friendliness. Such factors are
permissions, information about the developer and app reviews.
Privacy is not a simple binary state, which can be either true
or false. It is a manifestation on the continuum of control
over the access and processing of personal information [7] that
is evaluated differently by each individual based on personal
preferences. Hence, there is no optimum of privacy that is
valid globally. On the contrary, it seems to be paramount,
that users can process all the information they need with an
appropriate amount of resources in order to choose an option
that is as optimal as possible for user personally. Even if, from
a researcher’s point of view, those options not necessarily offer
the greatest privacy protection.
A closer look at the participants in the treatment group
that decided against the objectively best option reveals other
aspects that were taken into consideration by these participants
while choosing an app. Those aspects are either not contained
in the flyer, such as the design of the app, or are present in the
flyer, but do not vary significantly. An example of this would
be the number of ratings. This number varied for the aspects
in Task 1 between 1, 176 and 1, 231. The privacy-friendlier
option, that is the app that required no permissions, had the
lowest number of reviews among all aspects, while the apps
with a higher number of reviews requested unnecessary and
dangerous permissions. It therefore remains open, how the end
users decide on the trade-off between the heuristics that is most
optimal for their specific needs.
VII. RELATED WORK
A number of works aimed to support users’ privacy-related
decisions in the smartphone context. One research direction
focused on deriving methods for calculating the risk score
of an app and visualizing it to the users. This can be either
via modifying the interface of an app store or by providing
an external service [6], [15], [22], [23]. Depending on the
computation of the risk score, a complex analysis might
be required (e.g., code analysis and crowd-sourcing in the
PrivacyGrade project [15], [23]), and therefore, no decision
support will be provided for the apps that have not been
analyzed yet. Furthermore, presenting the privacy risk of the
app as a single value does not inform the user of different
factors that might influence the risk.
Other works focused on modifying the Play Store interface
by including additional explanation of the data collected by the
app. The proposal by Kelley et al. [13] introduces a privacy
display with the goal to make the information about data
collected by the app more clear to the user. The work by
Choe et al. [6] uses privacy nudges, informing the user on the
amount of time their sensitive information has been shared with
apps. A similar approach has been proposed by Balebako et
al. [2] and provides notices and visualizations to the users that
enable them to see when and how often their data has been
shared. Harbach et al. [11] propose the usage of personalized
examples, showing the user which of their stored data will
be shared by an app in case they decide to install it. Gerber
[10] uses expert recommendations and explaining interactions
between different permissions to better inform the user. These
works, however, focus on app permissions and do not consider
other privacy-relevant factors, such as the trustworthiness of
the app developer.
Information materials have been proposed by governmental
agencies, such as the German Office of Federation Security
[4], the US National Institute of Standards and Technology
[20], or the UK National Cyber Security Centre [19], that
aim to support either admins or end users in securing their
mobile devices. Most of the content of these materials, however,
is rather technical, aimed at users with IT-expertise, and to
our best knowledge, the extent to which these materials are
accessible to lay users has not been independently investigated.
Gerber [8] used an interactive training app to increase user
knowledge and the awareness of users with respect to privacy
related behavior related to their smartphone.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Since smartphones are used for a variety of tasks, apps
could access large amounts of personal and often also sensitive
data. Because these data can potentially be misused, it is up to
the user to decide whether installing a particular app presents
a considerable risk to this user’s privacy. While app stores
include information about the app that could help estimating
privacy risks, the complexity of this information, the confusing
user interfaces of app stores and general misconceptions about
smartphone privacy prevent users from making informed privacy
decisions.
To remedy this situation, we designed information material
in the form of a flyer that consists of two parts. The first
part deals with common misconceptions of users regarding
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their privacy in the smartphone context. These misconceptions
were identified by literature research and include beliefs
that prevented users from adequately protecting their privacy.
Examples for misconceptions are the belief that only politicians
or celebrities can become targets for attacks on privacy or
that apps in official app stores do not pose privacy risks.
The second part of the flyer contains various heuristics for
choosing privacy-friendlier apps. The heuristics are taken from
a previous interview study with IT-security experts about their
daily practice in using smartphones and their way of searching
and installing apps [14].
We evaluated the flyer in a between-subject lab study with
38 participants. The results show that the participants who
read the flyer several days before the study consider privacy-
relevant factors more frequently when selecting the apps than
the participants in the control group who did not read the
flyer. This result suggests that the flyer can improve the ability
of participants to make more informed decisions to protect
their privacy. Nevertheless, many participants in our study still
decided against a more data protection-friendly option when
selecting apps, despite considering data protection-relevant
factors.
Future work should therefore focus on further exploring
participants’ preferences and the trade-offs between different
decision factors related to privacy when using the smartphone.
Furthermore, the heuristics do not consider whether an app is
open-source. This information is not present in the app store
and the user would have to search for it. However, open-source
apps often form a privacy-friendly option, such as the open-
source ”Privacy Friendly Apps” [16], that advertise with privacy
optimization. The impact of the open-source property of an
app on the privacy-related decisions should be investigated in
future work.
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